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ABSTRACT
Many product development programs consist
of multiple integrated product eams (IPTs)
and functional groups.  Interteam information
dependencies greatly affect program success.
Program integration has thus become an issue
of increasing interest.  This paper
summarizes findings from five cas studies
of integrative mechanisms (IMs) in complex
system product development projects at
Chrysler, General Electric Aircraft Engines,
McDonnell Douglas, Sundstrand, and Texas
Instruments.  Two types of IMs are
investigated in this paper: (1) Systems
engineering and interface optimization and (2)
Improved information and communication
technologies.  As the appropriateness of a
given IM varies as a function of many
parameters—such as program stage, size,
complexity, risk, etc.—the goal of this
research was not to formulate a universal
template for IM application.  Rather, it is
hoped that the lessons learned by these five
programs will help others determine the
appropriateness of particular IMs in their
situations.  Also, the continued development
of an IM categorization scheme will hopefully
prove useful to those developing an
integration “tool kit.”
INTRODUCTION
Today, many product development programs
consist of multiple integrated product teams
(IPTs) and functional groups. Efforts
towards concurrent engineering and
accompanying new forms of program
organization have exposed interteam
information dependencies.  Program
integration has thus become an issue of
increasing interest.  While more of the
contemporary esearch as focused on the
characteristics and effectiveness of teams in
general (Katzenbach, 1993) and IPTs in
particular (Cole, 1995; Klein, 1994; Klein,
1995a; Klein, 1995b; Peters, 1995; Sheard,
1995; Susman, 1996a; Susman, 1996b), less
ha  been explicitly addressed in the realms of
interteam or program integration and the
differences between this and IPT formation.
The case for explicitly considering interteam
issues and the categorization of nine
integrative mechanisms (IMs) was presented
in a previous INCOSE paper. (Browning,
1996b)  This paper presents findings from
case studies of IMs used (or not used) in five
complex system product development
projects.  As the appropriateness of a given
IM varies as a function of many parameters—
such as program stage, size, complexity,
risk, etc.—the goal of this research was not
to formulate a universal template for IM
application.  Rather, it is hoped that the
lessons learned by these five programs will
help others determine the appropriateness of
particular IMs in their situations.  Also, the
continued development of an IM
categorization scheme will hopefully prove
useful to those developing an integration
“tool kit.”
To uncover a variety of interteam integration
issues within ongoing programs and to
investigate ach program’s use of IMs, an
exploratory, case study research method was
chosen.  Five case studies were researched
and written.  Full details of these efforts and
the five programs themselves are available in
(Browning, 1996a).  The case study
programs represent a breadth rather than a
depth of the defense aircraft industry.  They
span a variety of program sizes, stages, and
defense aircraft industry sectors—avionics,
airframes, and engines.  For the sake of
comparison and for a wider collection of
potential issues, a commercial aircraft
program and a commercial non-aircraft
program supplement he defense aircraft
programs.  Table 1 summarizes the five
programs.  The purpose of the research
includes showing what types of issues might
appear if this study was done at a more
focused level by persons intimately familiar
with their sector or a given product ype.
Also, the hope is that the reader will be able
to relate at least one of these cases to
programs with which she or he is fam liar.
Table 1.  Summary of Case Study Programs
Company Sector Program Phase
Relat ive Size
of Program
Texas Instruments (TI)Avionics GEN–X pre-production Small
McDonnell Douglas
(MDA)
Airframes F/A–18E/F EMD Large
General Electric Aircraft
Engines (GEAE)
Engines TACOE and
F110+
support Medium
Sundstrand Commercial
Aircraft
737–700 EPGS development Small
Chrysler Commercial
(non-aircraft)
Small Car
Platform (Neon)
development/
production
Large
INTEGRATIVE MECHANISMS
A previous paper outlined and described nine
categories of IMs. (Browning, 1996b)  To
recapitulate, IMs are strategies and tools for
effectively coordinating actions across teams
and groups within a program.  As catalysts,
they facilitate information flow across
communication barriers, such as a company
or program’s organizational structure,
incentive systems, location, leadership styles,
cultural differences, and management
traditions (Morelli, 1993, p. 11).  They must
also regulate information flow such that it
does not overwhelm or underwhelm its
recipients.  Here, the nine IMs studied are
broken into two categories:  (1) integration
enablers—IMs which provide for the
establishment of integration; and (2)
integration maintainers—IMs which monitor
and facilitate integration.  Together, they may
be thought of as the tools in a program
integration “tool kit.”1
Integration Enablers:
1.  Systems engineering and interface
optimization
                                                
1 Other typologies of integration and coordination
approaches have been developed.  This list expands upon
some categories in (McCord and Eppinger).
Coordination mechanisms useful in DFM contexts are
discussed by Adler in “Managing DFM:  Learning to
Coordinate Product and Process Design” in (Susman,
1992, pp. 140-156).
2.  Improved information and communication
technologies
3.  Training
4.  Co-location
5.  “Town meetings”
Integration Maintainers:
6.  Manager mediation
A.  Management hierarchy (“up-over-
down”)
B.  Heavyweight Product Managers
(HPMs) or Integrators
7.  Participant mediation
A.  Conflict Resolution Engineers
(CREs)
B.  Liaisons
C.  Engineering Liaisons (ELs)
8.  Interface “management” groups
A.  Predetermined
B.  Impromptu
9.  Interface contracts and scorecards
This paper will summarize findings regarding
the first two IMs in the above list.  Due to
space constraints, the remaining seven IMs
will have to be left for discussion elsewhere.2
FINDINGS REGARDING
INTEGRATIVE MECHANISMS
When is one IM more appropriate than
another?  How should they be applied?
While these questions will be addressed
                                                
2 All nine IMs are discussed in (Browning, 1996a).
below, indirectly, the difficulty of reaching
any universal conclusions should be evident.
IMs are tools, and different tasks can require
varied tools.  Integrators should be aware of
the strengths and weaknesses of IMs and
complement this with a broad knowledge of
the system product and the organization’s
culture and traditions.  No two programs are
alike, so it is impossible to find a set template
of IMs that are always most appropriate.
Some uses are better than others, however.
The following sections ummarize findings
regarding two types of IMs for the purpose
of better understanding and more appropriate
application.
Systems Engineering and Interface
Optimization
Designing the organization to mirror the
product architecture makes common sense.
If a system is well partitioned into
subsystems and elements, it will have a
minimal number of architectural interfaces.
Likewise, the teams developing these
subsystems and elements will usually require
the minimal amount of interaction with other
teams.  Rechtin sums up this concept with a
heuristic akin to that of minimum
communications:  “Design the elements to
make their performance as insensitive to
unknown or uncontrollable external
influences as practical.”  (Rechtin, 1991, p.
42)  This is also appropriate for IPTs, where
organization designers should maximize the
ability to communicate while minimizing the
need to do so.
When organizational integration of a cross-
functional, upstream/downstream, customer,
and supplier nature is the goal, making the
organization mirror the architecture becomes
especially challenging.  At what level should
the assimilation of these disparate views
occur?  within the IPTs?  This is not always
possible.  Perhaps some resources are only
available at the program level. Constraints
will often dictate the best level (position, not
amount) of cross-perspective integration.
However, an understanding of which
constraints are the most limiting can help
systems engineers and managers decide
where to apply the resources that will
gradually relax the constraints.
Organizational inertia will perhaps be the
biggest constraint of all: drastic change is
seldom met with enthusiasm from those
holding power.
Systemic approaches to organization have a
good chance of leveraging improvements in
c st, schedule, and performance.  Getting
everyone to buy in to the use of system
models can integrate decision makers and
lead to more enlightened choices of
o ganizational structures and more
ppropriate applications of IMs.  For
example, quality function deployment (QFD)
and approaches such as the requirements
allocation matrices (RAMs) and derived
allocation matrices (DRAMs) used at MDA
(Kepchar, 1994), deserve consideration for
their ability to systematically flow down
requirements and responsibilities through a
system architecture and an organization.
Systems engineering, applied to the
organization that develops the system, is a
primary, a priori ntegration enabler.
Improved Information and
Communication Technologies
A broad category of technologies have the
potential to enable integration.  We will look
at several of them in turn—first, elec ronic
m il.  Today, employees on most programs
have access to e-mail, at least internally.
While many attribute the reduction of hard
copy memos to the advent of e-mail, others
see e-mail as a hindrance to integration.  In
some programs, people copy their messages
to everyone else.  It is just as easy to send the
message to the whole program as it is to send
it to a single person; besides, one thinks it
better to provide the information to everyone,
lest some critical recipient be omitted and take
offense. Hence, some find themselves
inundated with information, much of it
nominally relevant.  While such messages are
an excellent way to keep abreast of the
program’s activities, most people do not have
the time to assimilate them all.  Instead, they
sometimes do not look at any of the
messages, figuring that any really important
notice will come to them through another
channel.  Soon, with others not able to count
on these individuals to read their e-mail,
senders do have to resort to other channels,
and the availability of e-mail is relegated to
little more than a novelty.  Individuals and
teams should realize who really needs to
know something:  i.e., they should be aware
of their interfaces.  Understandably, on a
multi-disciplined IPT, the amount of
information to assimilate—because of the
additional perspectives considered—will be
greater.  Eliminating superfluous information
becomes even more important here.  E-mail
messages coming from outside a team could
be filtered, perhaps by that team’s liaison.
Finally, some effort should be made to
archive messages, both centrally and
individually.  Sometimes e-mail documents
important decisions.  Thus, it would behoove
programs to establish guidelines for the use
of e-mail if they are going to rely on it as an
IM.
Improving common databases involves
embellishing the breadth and depth of the data
stored, increasing accessibility while
decreasing access time, establishing
standardized formats, ndtraining an ever-
greater amount of the workforce in their use.
Ideally, an IPT member could access all
databases easily and routinely from a single
terminal, such as a personal computer on his
or her desk. Engineering, manufacturing,
schedule, cost, test, and other data of many
types should be archived and made readily
available.  Critical parameters hould be
tracked regularly for elements, ubsystems,
and the system as whole; and these data
should be easily accessible.  To be shar d,
data must be represented in a common
language of mutually understood terms.
Sometimes different teams and functional
groups use terms differently—either using
the same name for different data or giving the
same data different names.  In these cas s,
the information receiver often goes to great
lengths to extract he desired information.
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group found
this to be a major barrier in their commercial
aircraft division.  A truly common database
overcomes these obstacles. Sometimes this
means team-wide training in a new
vocabulary. Sometimes this means
establishing a new data language altogether.
Another option is to provide special translator
tools in software that make the interface
appear seamless (i.e., pre- and post-
processors).  An excellent practice for
accessing common databases in a
standardized format is MDA’s utilization of
the Netscape3 browser on their intranet.  CD
ROMs also provide a good means of storing
easily distributable archives.
Standardizing hardware and software
presents a constant dilemma. While
                                                
3 Netscape is a trademark of Netscape Communications
Corp.
increased standardization facilitates IPT
integration in the short term, its long term
effects are less definite.  The global optimum
consists of a software policy that provides
good interoperability in the short term while
maintaining flexibility—by providing
alternatives and by fostering innovation—in
th  long term.  This includes recognizing that
th  ideal software of today may not be the
best choice for the future.  Software
companies change.  So do the companies one
works with:  the new partner company of the
future may have standardized on something
else.  Moreover, mature products can become
slow and inefficient.  New technologies leap
ahead.  Without consideration of the need to
maintain flexibility (because one realizes that
all of the variables that will influence the
choice may not be accounted for), the
tendency is to converge on and optimize the
nearest suboptimal point.  Optimizing at the
incorrect point actually places one farther
way from the global optimum (because of
the reluctance to sacrifice the sunk cost
investment).  Similarly, the choice of a single
software suite that has limited interface and
translation capabilities may be fine for a given
program, but it may not translate asily to
future programs or teams.  The trade between
standardization and the risks thereof must be
considered.  Decisions must consider when it
is best to foster innovation through a variety
of tools versus when it is best to channel
innovation through one tool, even if towards
a local optimum.
Electronic file transfer is essential to
interteam integration.  Local area networks
(LANs) and wide area networks (WANs) are
good, fast options.  Some form of network
or intranet should exist to tie everyone’s
workstations and terminals together.  E-mail
can also be used to transfer files, although the
c ding of files in binary (uu-encoding) or
binary-hexadecimal (BinHex) formats, unless
performed seamlessly by the mail software,
can be a barrier in some cas s.  Some are
wary of using e-mail for intersite file
transmission because of the lack of privacy.
This barrier can be overcome in some cases
by using encryption software.  Again, this
process is best performed automatically by
the e-mail software, although few
commercialized systems offer this capability.
CAD/CAM/CAE  systems are a critical IM,
facilitating file transfers and standardized
formats—aiding in design conversations and
providing “a flexible and unambiguous
design representation.” (Robertson, 1991, p.
6)  With the common point of reference these
tools bring, fewer interdisciplinary
misunderstandings occur and conversations
are more effective.  Research by Robertson
and Allen has shown that an increase in
performance due to CAD use is most strongly
realized when it is explicitly used to enable
cross-functional communication.4
(Robertson, 1991, p. 23)  Israel provides an
example where CAD was used as an IM to
enable concurrent engineering in the Convair
Division of General Dynamics in the
development of an advanced cruise missile:
The participating engineering functions
included structural analysis, human factors,
maintenance, and flight dynamics.  The
primary communication mechanism between
these functions was a Mechanical
Engineering CAD system.  Proposed designs
were file transferred from one engineering
group to another.  Analysis was conducted
and the results returned with commentary.
The commentaries in this case identified
structure over-designs.  By using this
information early on, a redesigned bulkhead
was generated with a significant weight
savings.  Additional commentary identified a
maintenance issue which required the
removal of another bulkhead in order to
service one of the electronics packages.  This
removal process would have required two
men and a special support dolly.  Use of the
CAD system helped to incorporate a hinged
supporting member, thus eliminating the
need for the special dolly and one of the two
support personnel.  The General Dynamics
example is illustrative of the use of a CAD
system as a communications enabler which
supported information flow and problem
identification by overcoming distance and
language barriers which typically arise
between functional engineering disciplines.
(Israel, 1992, p. 24)
Rosenbaum and Postula single out the three-
dimensional capabilities of CAD tools as their
chief integrative characteristic:
We live in a three-dimensional world.
Most people cannot quickly and easily
visualize well from two-dimensional views.
The result is that designs represented by
                                                
4 They also recommend each CAD system have a text
message template to standardize annotations.
drawings are frequently the private domain of
designers and drafters.  It is not surprising
then that drawings often yield designs that
cannot be manufactured, cannot be
maintained, and do not meet customer
expectations. …
In fact, solid modeling is the key to
successful team (concurrent) design.
Through solid modeling of parts in extreme
detail, very small clearances can be verified
(including tolerances) electronically.  In
similar fashion, electronic mockup of tubing
and harnesses can eliminate the need for
physical mockups.  Companies that have
instituted such programs have shown
savings in excess of 40 percent.
Probably the most important attribute
of the solid modeling approach is that all
functions, from design to analysis to
manufacturing to estimating to management,
have simultaneous access to an
unambiguous description of the product—in
real time. (Rosenbaum, 1991, p. D.3.5)
Today, most complex development programs
in the defense aircraft industry use
CAD/CAM/CAE packages to some extent.
As Sundstrand found, however, transitioning
to new CAE tools can slow a project down.
Such transitions should be avoided
midstream whenever possible.  In fact, many
companies have a software tools functional
group that explores new CAE tools and
makes recommendations for future
directions.  These groups are hopefully aware
of the integrative aspects of the tools.  Many
programs, notably the F/A–18E/F program
and some Boeing commercial programs, have
attributed vast improvements in the
development cycle to the use of CAE tools
such as CATIA and Unigraphics and CAM
tools such as Variation Simulation Analysis
(VSA).  Two- and three-dimensional models
have provided for the early recognition of
problems (in some cases) and the ability to do
rapid, virtual prototyping.  Use of the same
tools by the subcontractors has also facilitated
integration between these groups.
Scheduling and process modeling software
can also contribute to integration.  A
standardized schedule is a good place to
highlight critical issues that could cause
delays.  The previous section already
mentioned the integrative effects of having a
common modeling tool from which to
analyze and ask questions about the program.
Some of the five case study programs are
experimenting with the use of tools such as
RDD–100™ (Ascent Logic Corp.) for
process modeling.  RDD–100 is an example
of a systems engineering tool with the
potential to integrate program decisions.
However, the steep learning curves
associated with many of these function-
packed software packages may inhibit
integrative overtures.
Many non-software tools and methodologies
were also used as successful IMs in the case
study companies.  MDA’s IPD data sheets
and GEAE’s electronic worksheets serve to
standardize the format of data characterization
both within and between teams.  MDA’s use
of the Geometric Dimensioning and
Tolerancing (GD&T) language establishes a
common vocabulary for multi-discipline
interactions.  In addition to common
reference terms, archives of lessons learned
that can be saved and shared not only provide
an IM but also foster a policy of learning
within the organization.  GEAE’s Design
Record Book and Chrysler’s “Book of
Knowledge” are excellent examples of these
types of efforts. (Some programs are
expanding to software nabled, knowledge
based tools.) On a broader scale, well-
organized process guides—used and
provided with training in their interpretation
and use—can allow more of the product
development process to proceed on an
integrated basis.  Excellent examples of good
practices along these lines include GEAE’s
Engine Development Cycle Process Guide
and TI’s RF/Microwave Business Unit
Teaming Handbook.  While these particular
guides could be expanded by explicitly
outlining additional approaches and tools,
they provide a common framework for an
entire program to approach the design
process.  Such handbooks probably should
include guidelines on the appropriate uses of
IMs as well.  Finally, one of the most
effective, non-software IMs—bulletin
boards—has been used for a long time.  One
should not underestimate their importance,
even in an electronic age. Often an entire
conference room will have walls filled with
activity and status reports and schedules.
These provide opportunities for employees to
discuss aspects of the program in a casual
sense and get a better feel for its breadth and
depth.
Note that the approaches included in this
category of improved information and
communication technologies represent several
information tasks:   transfer (dissemination),
access, and assimilation.  Technologies
facilitating any one of these areas may not
necessarily further them all.  For example,
some technologies, such as teleconferencing,
make information exchange so expedient that
the propensity to not document that exchange
increases.  One must consider such factors if
record keeping is a priority.  Taking CAD as
another example, researchers have looked at
th  different roles tools like CAD can play in
an organization:  as physical capital, as
support for human capital, or as enablers for
improvements in social capital (i.e., as an
IM). (Robertson, 1991, pp. 4-7)  The
existence of three (or more) ways of viewing
these types of tools implies that not everyone
recognizes them as an IM and that their mere
presence does not guarantee superior
integration.  In fact, some research shows
CAD can have a negative effect on
integration. (Jakiela, 1990) Certainly, the
ease of making changes in CAD does not
encourage documentation i the form of
annotations.  While no one likes excessive
documentation, and “improved
communication” is seen as the way around it,
some amount of design history is necessary
for future access.  Hauptman and Allen
highlight some of the major literature on
information and communication technologies
in their 1987 paper, which discusses the
capabilities, drawbacks, and perceptions of
these new approaches. (Hauptman, 1987)
Also, much more has been said in other
places about the roles many of these
technologies need to play withinIPTs.5
This section has focused on interteam
integration aspects of improved information
and communication technologies.  While the
IMs in this category possess great potential to
enable integration, they will not work best
alone as a bandage for an improperly
organized program.  As Wheelwright and
Clark point out, only organizations that have
broken down interteam barriers, integrated
functional activities, developed structured
design processes, and provided appropriate
organization and leadership can expect to
realize the full benefits of technological
solutions. (Wheelwright, 1992, p. 242)
CONCLUSIONS
                                                
5 See (Hartley, 1992)
This paper has summarized the general
findings on two IMs from five case studies of
complex system product development
programs.  While universal guidelines for IM
use cannot be derived from such a study,
increased understanding of appropriate IM
applications was achieved.  Above all, the
realization that interteam integration, when
addressed explicitly and handled
appropriately, has the potential to greatly
reduce cost, schedule, and system
performance risks should spur greater
integrative efforts.
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